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http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TOKYO6404.html#
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO6404
2006-11-07 22:56
2011-08-30 01:44
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8091
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4795
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1851
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8168
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0905
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4149
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8718
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 1233
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2117
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9772
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 6193
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DISA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 006404

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER AS ID RP TH AF PK IZ JA KN
MY
SUBJECT: U.S.-AUSTRALIA-JAPAN SECOND TRILATERAL COUNTERTERRORISM CONSULTATIONS

REF: A. 05 STATE 179157
¶B. 05 STATE 191306
¶C. 05 STATE 180524
¶D. CANBERRA 352
¶E. CANBERRA 1023 AND PREVIOUS

TOKYO 00006404 001.2 OF 008

Classified By: Ambassador J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. Reasons 1.4 (B), (D).

¶1. (S/REL AUS) Summary: U.S., Australian, and Japanese
Ambassadors for Counterterrorism and their interagency
delegations held the second round of trilateral
counterterrorism consultations in Tokyo on October 24.
Participants offered general threat assessments for
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The Australians
believed that while Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was adapting to
governments’ counterterrorism efforts, JI’s rhetoric was not
gaining political traction in Indonesia. A Japanese delegate
worried that the impasse in the peace process between the
Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
might be exploited by terrorists. S/CT Ambassador Crumpton
was concerned that the ethnic conflict in southern Thailand
could be cast into the larger radicalization context.
Crumpton provided a brief review of progress in the war on
terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S. views on Iran’s
terrorism activities at the request of the Japanese
delegation. The three sides expressed concern about North
Korea selling weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and
about the threat of bioterrorism.

¶2. (S/REL AUS) The six breakout sessions discussed law
enforcement/legal affairs, maritime security,
border/transport security, terrorist financing, intelligence
sharing, and biological terrorism. There was consensus in
all sessions that the three countries should share
assessments and coordinate training efforts. Proposals for
future cooperation included supporting currency reporting
systems in Southeast Asia in an effort to stop terrorists
from transporting bulk cash to finance their efforts, and
sharing open source analysis to inform counter-radicalization
efforts. The U.S. and Australian delegations also emphasized
the long-term need to challenge terrorist ideologies. A U.S.
delegation debrief highlighted concerns about the lack of
time for in-depth discussion and concrete proposals for the
future, noting Japanese hesitancy as a recurring problem.
The delegates encouraged intersessional work to prepare
deliverables for the next trilat which Australia will host in
early 2007. End Summary.

¶3. (C/REL AUS/JPN) U.S., Australian, and Japanese
Ambassadors for Counterterrorism and their interagency
delegations met on October 24 in Tokyo for the second round
of trilateral counterterrorism consultations. (Note: Refs
A, B, and C are the reports from the inaugural meeting in
September 2005.) S/CT Ambassador Henry Crumpton led the U.S.
team which included participants from the Departments of
State, Homeland Security (including Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the Office of
International Affairs, and the U.S. Coast Guard), Defense
(including PACOM), and Justice (including the FBI).
Australian Counterterrorism Ambassador Mike Smith led the GOA
delegation which included representatives from the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence,
Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Customs Service,
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center,
Australian Federal Police, Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, Department of Transport and Regional
Services, Office of National Assessments, and the Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet. International
Counterterrorism Cooperation Ambassador Akio Suda headed the
Japanese delegation which included officials from the

TOKYO 00006404 002.2 OF 008

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cabinet Office, National Police
Agency, Japan Defense Agency, Ministry of Justice, Public
Security Intelligence Agency, Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Coast Guard, and the
Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society.

Opening Remarks Highlight Continued Threat
——————————————
¶4. (C/REL AUS/JPN) Japanese Counterterrorism (CT) Ambassador
Suda opened the meeting by reminding participants of the
continued threat of terrorism, noting terrorist attacks that
had occurred since the inaugural September 2005 trilateral
meeting – primarily the October 2005 Bali bombings and the
disrupted August 2006 London airline hijacking plot. (Note:
He later suggested that the trilateral partners discuss
aviation security in response to the plot.) Suda highlighted
the evolving methods of terrorists and the continued appeal
of violent Islamic extremism as challenges we face.
Ambassadors Crumpton and Smith agreed and reiterated the
importance of eliminating stove pipes and fostering
interagency cooperation to better combat terrorism. They
also expressed their desire for concrete, practical outcomes
on which to move forward.

SE Asia Assessment: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand
——————————————— ——-
¶5. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Session I began with general assessments
of the terrorist threat. Australian CT Ambassador Smith
summarized developments in the Southeast Asia region. Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) operatives were responding to governments’
counterterrorism efforts by adapting their methods and
ideology, he said. They were increasingly using the
internet, promoting the single narrative of Muslim
victimhood, and successfully evading authorities. On the
positive side, however, JI’s appeal and tactics were not
gaining political traction in Indonesia, Smith believed. The
Indonesian parliament supported UN declarations on terrorism
and moderate Muslim leaders were arguing against terrorist
diatribes. Indonesian law enforcement and intelligence
authorities were also disrupting JI networks and reducing its
capabilities. He noted that ongoing efforts in Jolo in the
southern Philippines were forcing JI operatives to flee.

¶6. (S/REL AUS/JPN) The bigger, long-term challenge was the
ideological battle, Smith emphasized, stating that we needed
to do a better job of replying to JI rhetoric with appealing
counterarguments. Australian Office of National Assessments
Southeast Asia Assistant Secretary David Engel added that
Indonesians had a developing attachment to democracy and did
not see it as contradicting Islam. Indonesians were
expressing themselves more as Muslims in recent times but
greater religiosity should not be equated with
radicalization, Engel cautioned. S/CT Ambassador Crumpton
agreed with the GOA assessment and added that he was
concerned that the ethnic conflict in southern Thailand could
be cast into the larger radicalization context.

¶7. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Taeko Takahashi, Minister at the Japanese
Embassy in Manila, was concerned that the peace process
between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) was at an impasse that might be
exploited by terrorists. She said that the Japanese would
try to pressure officials to get back on track and suggested
U.S. and Australian officials do the same. Japan was taking
a more active role in the peace process as well, Takahashi
added. In July 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Aso announced
that Japan would send an expert to monitor the rehabilitation
and economic development situation in the MILF-conflicted
areas as part of the International Monitoring Team. This
expert would be supported by a “Mindanao Task Force” made up

TOKYO 00006404 003.2 OF 008

of officials from the Japanese Embassy, Japan International
Cooperation Agency, and Japan Bank for International
Cooperation.

Stocktake of Iraq/Afghanistan/Iran
———————————-
¶8. (S/REL AUS/JPN) At the request of the Japanese
delegation, Ambassador Crumpton briefly reviewed of the
status of the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S.
views on Iran’s terrorism activities. He acknowledged that
violence in Iraq continued at high levels and that the
insurgency was being used as a recruiting tool by terrorists.
He said there were four types of violence in Iraq:
international terrorism perpetrated by al-Qaeda in Iraq,
sectarian violence (mainly Sunni v. Shia), the insurgency
against Coalition forces, and criminal violence (kidnapping,
etc.). Ambassador Smith did not believe that Southeast Asian
terrorists were involved in the Iraq insurgency, although
they had been in Afghanistan. He lamented the role of Iran
and Syria in introducing jihadis into Iraq and asked about
the threat of returning jihadis; would Iraq have larger
numbers than the conflict between Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union? Crumpton replied that the number of foreign fighters
leaving Iraq was very small because they were either suicide
bombers or killed in combat.

¶9. (S/REL AUS/JPN) In Afghanistan, NATO and Coalition forces
were doing well, Crumpton stated, but there was still the
problem of poppy production and economic development. A U.S.
delegation of senior executives recently went to Afghanistan
to look at investment opportunities, he noted. Japanese
delegates inquired about terrorism from Pakistan, as Indian
officials had expressed concern to them about Pakistani
terrorists committing acts across their border. Crumpton
stated that Pakistan had captured more al-Qaeda leaders than
any other country and that the main concern was the stability
of the Musharraf government. If Musharraf were overthrown,
what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal?

¶10. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Iran was the most active state sponsor
of terrorism since the revolution of 1979, Crumpton assessed.
Iran was sponsoring activities inside Iraq by providing
training and explosives to insurgents, supporting attacks
against Israel through Hezbollah, and supporting Sunni
terrorist groups in a temporary alliance. The Iranian
Government was also holding al-Qaeda leaders as “bargaining
chips,” he said.

Potential for DPRK to Sell Weapons to Terrorists
——————————————— —
¶11. (S/REL AUS/JPN) The Japanese delegation also requested
U.S. and Australian comments on North Korea’s recent nuclear
test in the context of the DPRK selling such weapons to
terrorists. Secretary Rice was firmly committed to
maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula and was
similarly concerned about North Korea selling weapons to
terrorists, Ambassador Crumpton said. He mentioned that the
U.S. was currently conducting an intelligence assessment on
North Korean capability to conduct terrorist actions,
including employment of a nuclear device and would share that
review when it was complete. He was particularly concerned
about North Korea infiltrating South Korea or Japan with a
CBRN weapon.

¶12. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Australian CT Ambassador Smith spoke
briefly about the North Korean ship Pong Su which was
captured smuggling drugs into Australia (Ref D). He recalled
the recent GOA decision to ban all North Korean-flagged
vessels from stopping at Australian ports in response to the
DPRK’s nuclear test. However, this did not stop the North

TOKYO 00006404 004.2 OF 008

Koreans from using vessels with flags of convenience, Smith
said. He noted GOA concern that the DPRK had both the
technological capability to produce weapons and a leader
willing to go to any length to obtain money for the regime –
a fortuitous combination for international terrorists.

Bioterrorism
————
¶13. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Crumpton believed bioterrorism was the
least mature and least advanced portion of international
counterterrorism cooperation, which was why the U.S.
requested it be added to the agenda for the trilat. State’s
Senior Advisor for Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health
Security Marc Ostfield explained that bioterrorism was at the
intersection of several areas such as public health, law
enforcement, foreign policy, and intelligence. It had no
boundaries unlike other forms of terrorism and was much more
difficult to contain. Interagency and intergovernmental
cooperation were key to combating this threat and the U.S.
welcomed suggestions from the international community about
how to develop guidelines for prevention and response.

Overview of Current CT Programs
——————————-
¶14. (S/REL AUS/JPN) The Japanese hosts gave a detailed
presentation about their recent CT efforts, including their
domestic Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism,
amendments to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition
Act, activities through the UN, CTAG, ASEAN, APEC, and ARF,
and bilateral cooperation. They listed nine main areas in
which they have provided capacity-building assistance to
other nations: aviation security, port and maritime
security, immigration, combating terrorist financing, customs
cooperation, export control and nonproliferation, law
enforcement cooperation, counter-CBRN terrorism, and
counterterrorism international conventions and protocols.

¶15. (S/REL AUS/JPN) In FY 2006, Japan started two new
frameworks: grant aid for cooperation on counterterrorism
and security enhancement, and the Japan-ASEAN Integration
Fund, funded at US$63 million and US$68 million respectively,
Japanese officials continued. Under the former framework, a
US$1.75 million grant of three patrol vessels to Indonesia
had already been given. This was an exception to the Three
Principles on Arms Exports, Japanese officials noted. Japan
also pushed CT as an agenda for ASEAN at the June 2006
ASEAN-Japan Counterterrorism Dialogue. MOFA International
Counterterrorism Cooperation Director Rokuichiro Michii said
that ASEAN officials had been hesitant to use the term
“counter-radicalization” in discussions because it implied
that “Islam was wrong.” They preferred to use the term
“public involvement in countering terrorism” instead. Japan
would continue to push for more activity on this front, he
said.

¶16. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Crumpton listed several areas
in which the U.S. was advancing since the inaugural
trilateral meeting: PACOM and DOD were working aggressively
in the Philippines; the U.S. now had military-to-military
relations with Indonesia which enabled increased engagement;
DOD and State were cooperating more on funding for combating
terrorism; transformational diplomacy had shifted positions
to more troubled regions of the world which would help the
U.S. understand more fully the local grievances that
terrorists try to exploit; and the U.S. was keen to include
the private sector in CT efforts that promoted economic
growth.

¶17. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Smith announced that
Australia and Indonesia would co-host a subregional

TOKYO 00006404 005.2 OF 008

ministerial meeting on CT in Indonesia in mid-January (Ref
E). The GOA had committed A$450 million (US$ 340 million) in
CT assistance to Southeast Asia since 2004, focused on border
and maritime security, law enforcement, and intelligence
sharing. (Note: This figure does not include defense and
select intelligence activities.) In May 2006, the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade alone received A$35 million (US$
26 million) over four years for additional CT programs aimed
primarily at the battle of ideas, CBRN terrorism, and
emergency/incidence response.

Breakout Sessions & Areas for Future Cooperation
——————————————— —
¶18. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Session II reviewed breakout session
discussions and potential areas for intensified trilateral
engagement. There were six breakout sessions: law
enforcement/legal affairs (chaired by the U.S.), maritime
security (chaired by Australia), border/transport security
(chaired by Australia), financing (chaired by the U.S.),
intelligence sharing (chaired by Japan), and biological
terrorism (chaired by Japan). (Note: Non-papers will be
drawn up by each session chair summarizing key points and
potential areas for future cooperation. These papers will be
distributed to embassies upon completion. A brief summary of
the breakout sessions follows below.)

¶19. (S/REL AUS/JPN) In the law enforcement session,
participants discussed the importance of coordinating
training efforts, perhaps through in-country joint meetings
with designated CT POCs or on the Bali Process website.
Referring to Indonesia specifically, they discussed current
efforts to train prosecutors and the successful Japanese
program of developing community policing, which Ambassador
Smith noted had been very useful given the fear of
approaching corrupt policemen. They also suggested that
training efforts take advantage of regional centers such as
the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC)
and the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism
(SEARCCT). The maritime security group discussed various
assessments conducted by the trilateral partners, including a
maritime needs assessment by Australia and the Border Control
Assessment Initiative (BCAI) by the U.S., and the need to
share such information so as not to duplicate efforts.
Participants also discussed progress on the Coast Watch South
initiative in the Philippines, for which a bilateral approach
might be more appropriate at this time, according to the
Australian delegation. The border/transport security session
covered a range of areas such as identity security, including
biometrics, movement alert lists, and lost and stolen
passport information exchanges, as well as the need to screen
air cargo. Air cargo was more of a vulnerability now that
cockpits had been fortified.

¶20. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Department of Homeland Security
officials led a discussion on cash couriers and the movement
of bulk cash in the finance session. With anti-terrorist
financing efforts forcing terrorists to use cash instead of
banks, there was a new need to create rules and penalties for
transporting cash. Legislative reporting requirements were
essential to force public involvement. The U.S., Australia,
and Japan could work together to develop effective currency
reporting systems in Southeast Asia.

¶21. (S/REL AUS/JPN) One question remained: how do we deal
with virtual money transfers? On the intelligence front,
participants discussed the importance of sharing lists of
suspected terrorists and threat assessments. One possible
area for cooperation was sharing open source analysis on
particular countries or issues as a useful research element
for counter-radicalization projects. The bioterrorism

TOKYO 00006404 006.2 OF 008

session emphasized the need to raise awareness of the threat
and to force public health and law enforcement agencies to
cooperate on prevention and response planning. Participants
noted that public health elicited less sensitivity as a topic
than counterterrorism so that might be a good way to frame
efforts.

Follow-up on Manila Experts’ Meeting
————————————
¶22. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Session III focused on follow-up
discussion from the February 2006 Australia-Japan-U.S.
trilateral counterterrorism experts’ meeting in Manila. The
Australian delegation gave an update on the GOA’s
adopt-a-port proposal which they said the Philippine
Government would have to take the lead on, with discreet
U.S.-Australia-Japan involvement. The port proposal had a
“rough road ahead,” Smith admitted. The GOA would hire a
consultant to report on the feasibility of and options for
working with specific ports. The GOA hoped to meet in May
2007 to discuss the report and possible contributions and
start the project in July or August. The U.S. delegation
mentioned that the BCAI report should be completed by
December and that could direct efforts to a particular port
as well. Ambassador Smith added that the BCAI could help
raise awareness with the Philippine Government and encourage
buy-in for the port proposal. Ambassador Crumpton raised the
possibility of the adopt-a-port project attracting foreign
investment as security improved. This would assist with the
economic growth portion of our CT efforts.

Ideological Issues
——————
¶23. (S/REL AUS/JPN) In Session IV, participants generated a
discussion about the struggle to counter terrorist
ideologies. U.S. analyst Katherine Marquis described
different types of radicalism and activism, emphasizing that
there was no unified extremist Islamic ideology. We needed
to consider the possibility that Muslims who oppose bin Laden
might also oppose us and think about how to connect with that
constituency. “What issues resonate with Muslims?” Marquis
asked. Is it really women’s rights or more education?
Crumpton underscored Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs Karen Hughes’ initiative to discredit
terrorist rhetoric and look for common values. He also
addressed the growing value of non-state actors as partners
in countering extremist ideologies, mentioning several
projects that private companies had already begun.

¶24. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Smith reiterated the need to
challenge the “single narrative” of terrorist rhetoric. He
said the GOA had commissioned a survey in Indonesia about
attitudes toward terrorism and hoped to do the same in the
Philippines. The Indonesian Government’s CT Coordinating
Desk had approached Australia about supporting a documentary
on how terrorism affects the daily lives of people. The GOA
was also looking at working with Islamic NGOs to promote
moderate Islam, stigmatizing terrorism through media
projects, and studying the economic costs of terrorism. He
again stressed the need for the trilateral partners to
conduct these efforts discreetly to create the biggest
effect. Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs Southeast Asia Assistant Director Glen
Elson described Australia’s domestic approach to countering
extremism. The GOA released a National Action Plan (NAP)in
July to build social cohesion and security. It would include
establishing a National Institute of Islamic Studies,
providing crisis management training, and starting education
and employment initiatives.

¶25. (S/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Suda concluded the session by

TOKYO 00006404 007.2 OF 008

underscoring the need to address a range of issues to be most
effective in the ideological battle, including poverty,
education, government instability, and mutual respect and
understanding among cultures and religions. He reinforced
that this work would be most effective when conducted by
non-state groups. Underlying Islamic radicalism was an
anti-Western sentiment, he assessed. Though Japan was often
seen as “Western” by its Asian neighbors, it still had a
distinctly Asian history and culture that could help it play
a unique role in countering extremist ideologies in Southeast
Asia, he asserted. Japan found through its exchange program
with Indonesian teachers that most teachers believed Islam in
the Middle East was not “real” Islam; rather Islam in
Southeast Asia was more authentic. The Australian delegation
also found this to be the case. This belief could be
exploited in future counter-radicalization projects, Suda
noted.

Conclusion
———-
¶26. (C/REL AUS/JPN) Ambassador Smith said Australia would
host the next trilateral meeting in the first half of 2007,
likely in March. He suggested that trilateral working groups
at embassies in Manila, Jakarta, and Bangkok meet
intersessionally to pave the way for concrete proposals at
the next meeting. Ambassador Crumpton agreed that embassies
should take the lead in maintaining the momentum of the
trilat. He also highlighted a few areas of particular
interest that arose in the plenary discussion: biometrics,
seafarer identification, stored value cards (as a terrorist
financing problem), and cooperation on open source analysis.

Debrief Comments & Way Forward
——————————
¶27. (S) Comment: The U.S. delegation held a debrief on
October 25 to assess the outcomes of the trilateral
consultations and consider next steps. Overall, the
delegation was disappointed with the lack of both substantive
discussions in the plenary and breakout sessions and
proposals for further cooperation. The main issue was the
cautious and hesitant approach of the Japanese delegation.
While the U.S. and Australian delegations came prepared with
specific proposals and were ready to commit to action, the
Japanese were not ready to put forth concrete ideas and
seemed unable to agree to any actions during the
consultations. The delegates also believed the breakout
sessions were too short which did not allow for full
engagement on the issues. The language barrier was cited as
another hindrance to detailed discussions. On the positive
side, there was consensus in every breakout session about the
importance of sharing assessments and coordinating training
efforts, including curriculum development and equipment
provision.

¶28. (S) Ambassador Crumpton stated that the U.S. and
Australia were ready to move ahead bilaterally with several
proposals, but they would give the Japanese every opportunity
to participate along the way. He suggested that we reassess
after the next trilateral whether the trilateral
consultations were worth continuing and whether bilateral
efforts with the Australians would be more productive. The
U.S. delegation proposed the following ideas to ensure a more
productive encounter at the next trilateral counterterrorism
consultations in Australia in 2007.

–Work intersessionally to prepare deliverables.

This could be done in Washington and through more formal
embassy trilateral working groups in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur,
Manila, and Bangkok. The Department would send a cable to

TOKYO 00006404 008.2 OF 008

these embassies to encourage such coordination and follow-up,
focused particularly on threat assessments and training
efforts. Embassies would also be encouraged to keep the
trilateral framework in mind when proposing any CT programs.

Ambassador Crumpton will meet with Australian CT Ambassador
Smith the second week of December at a conference in London.
He suggested that the U.S. delegates prepare non-papers for
each breakout session topic with brief summaries of U.S.
thinking and proposals for further action. These should be
ready by the end of November to pass to Embassy Canberra and
Tokyo to obtain host government feedback. Crumpton could
then confirm projects with Smith at their meeting.

Additional suggestions for facilitating more substantive
discussions at the next trilat included having longer
breakout sessions and conducting breakout sessions at the
working level the day before the plenary.

–Make proposals to the Japanese about projects they could
fund with their unused FY 06 CT budget.

Michii’s presentation of the Japan’s current CT efforts only
showed a US$1.75 million allocation out of US$63 million for
the new grant aid program for cooperation on counterterrorism
and security enhancement. DHS Director for Asia/Pacific
International Affairs Paul Fujimura suggested that we propose
specific projects that the Japan could support from their
remaining budget. The public/private economic partnership
idea discussed in the plenary could be one area in which to
engage the Japanese.

–On bioterrorism specifically, fold APEC events into
trilateral work.

¶29. (U) This cable was cleared by S/CT.

SCHIEFFER
SCHIEFFER

   

 

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