Mar 042013




His Excellency


President of the Republic of the Philippines



THRU: Honorable Secretary


Department of National Defense


General, AFP

Chief of Staff, AFP


Presidential Adviser on National Security

Director-General, National Security Council

His Excellency:

We have the honor to inform you that per your instruction to this TASK FORCE BLACK CRESCENT, we have already though reading, reviewing, analyzing and assessing your good administration’s comprehensive and integrative framework plan for the complete subjugation of the entire forces, leadership and camps of the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Indeed, the Project OPLAN MINDANAO II or BLACK RAIN is admirable, meritorious and commendable for a government faced with Muslim secessionism and communist rebellion simultaneously. The previous administration attempted to solve both problems but virtually failed on the following ground:

1. they appreciated the rich history of the Muslim Filipinos or Moros in fighting their colonizers, i.e. the Spaniards, Americans, Japanese, and our very government which succeeded these previous colonizers;

2. they undermined the rise of the CPP-NPA-NDF from a mass based organization to an international front struggling to topple down any administration in the Philippines and replace it with the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist communism.

3. they used harsh methods in dealing with these problems and underestimated the capacity of the Moros and CPP-NPA-NDF to launch Holy War or Jihad and protracted armed struggle respectively thereby further aggravating the deteriorating economic situation of the country;

4. they failed to understand the complexities of the secessionist and communist problems as they relate to political, economic and security concerns of the country vis-a-vis the Muslim World and the Communist Countries; and

5. they never really intended to solve both problems in a peaceful way to avert loss of lives and destruction of properties for personal glory.

Your Excellency, we would like to present our point-by-point analysis of the 50-page TOP SECRET OPLAN MINDANAO II / BLACK RAIN signed on March 5, 2000 by no less than Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Angelo T. Reyes and his excellency, the President.

Let us begin on the Black rain’s objectives.


1. To siege, assault, and capture the main MILF enclave of Camp Abubakar As-Siddique through simultaneous, massive continuous air, naval and ground assaults.

2. To lure guerrillas from other camps to converge at Camp Abubakar As-Siddique, and attack other camps depleted of manpower and firepower.

3. To pressure the MILF Central Committee to abandon demand of self-rule.

4.  To pout development projects within MILF camps / controlled areas to strengthen International Political Front in order to discourage Islamic countries to support the MILF cause, and to effect the Invisible War Doctrine Strategy.”

Objective No. 1 must not be the first priority of the Plan since our past war experiences with the Moro rebels reveal with commonalities that any military attack to the MILF main camp gives the MILF every reason for the Muslim communities to support their struggle financially, morally and physically – the three basics of a people’s war. By implementing this outright, the government is putting itself in a dilemma of Filipino people’s harsh reaction to the methods employed, and the government’s popularity among the 54-member Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Muslim dominated powerful Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). By doing so, the Estrada Administration is courting a similar people’s power that overthrew former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and an international oil embargo resulting from undermining the dynamics and cohesiveness of the Muslim World. Further, the MILF’s major base is well-fortified and heavily guarded by around three to four thousand rebels guarding all possible entrances such as those in Garigayan, Buldon, Maguindanao; Sapad, Matanog, Maguindanao; and Kapatagan, Lanao del Sur. Therefore, objective 2 is likely to happen where Camp Abubakar’s defenses are too tight and strong for our soldiers to penetrate.

Objective No. 4 must be our priority taking into consideration its visibility and applicability in the present status. Secretary Aventajado must be encouraged further to forge many more development project agreements with the MILF before launching Objective No. 1. This is to ensure total success of Objective No. 1 without really forcing the MILF central City Mayor Ludovico Badoy and his city administrator and defeated mayor candidate Rodel Manara; former Cotabato City Mayor Leonardo ___retana; Cotabato City councilors Alexis Costales, Atty. Froilan Melendrez, Atty. Wilfrido Bueno and Atty. Noel Felongco; Pigcawayan Mayor Eliseo Garces, Jr., and most Christian municipal mayors of Region XII were practically identified as ANTI-MILF who receive a regular orientation in Camp Aguinaldo on Col. Corpus’ x x x. The allowance Camp Aguinaldo gives them comes from the intelligence fund of the AFP.

It is assumed that all Muslim municipal and city mayors in Mindanao are sympathetic, if not supporters, of MILF (see attached draft list by Mayor Benjamin de Guzman). It is also verified that ARMM Regional Governor and MNLF Cahirman Nur Misuari, RLA Speaker Kabilan Sema, SKSRC-MNLF Chairman Datu Dimalao “Alladin” Ambel, DENR-ARMM Regional Secretary Faizal “Randy” Karon, DOST-ARMM Regional Secretary Hamim “Alfatah” Abubakar, DILG-ARMM Regional Secretary Abduljabbar “Narra” Abduljalil, and Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin Sema are staunch advocates of MNLF-MILF unification and are regularly contributing financial and humanitarian assistance to the MILF. This administration must verify the top secret reports of ISAFP furnished to this Task Force that all Muslim Embassies in the Philippines are directly funneling huge amount of dollars to the MILF in their armed struggle to achieve independence. Our Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon must summon the Muslim Ambassadors and Heads of Missions of subject countries and remind them once again that the secessionist problem is “internal to the Philippine” and what they are doing is a recognized form of direct intervention in the affairs of the sovereign Philippine government to where their missions are accredited. DFA must warn them not to interfere or declare them persona non grata. The Esrada Administration must seriously review its foreign policy with regard to the Muslim World.

The National Security Council and the National Cluster “E” must also look into reports of ISAFP chief and DCS J-2 M/Gen. Benjamin Libarnes that Indonesia and Malaysia are directly engaged in arms trading with the MILF and MNLF. Gen. Libarnes’ report (see attached copy) revealed that:

“While King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, terrorist Osama bin Laden, and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei Darussalam purchased few months ago the 5,000 assorted high-powered weapons from American gunrunners (mostly CIA operatives disguising as gunrunners), Malaysia and Indonesia provided for their transport from the port of Manado in Indonesia where the arms were shipped from the U.S. to the port of Sandakan in Sabah, Malaysia. Afterwards, the arms and ammunition caches were transported onto two submarines operated by the Malaysian and Indonesian navies.

General Libarnes continued that “Lt. Gen. Diomedio Villanueva, AFP commanding general of Southern Command, and M/Gen. Gregorio M. Camiling, Jr., division commander of 6th ID in Maguindanao, B/Gen. Roy A. Cimatu, AFP division commander of 4th ID in Cagayan de Oro City, and former CGPA Lt. Gen. Raul S. Urgello, AFP, were twice spotted as “tourists” in Hyatt Regency Hotel in Labuan, Malaysia’s offshore financial center, conferring with top Defense officials of Malaysia and Indonesia on how will the two submarines navigate Philippine water without being intercepted by the NavForSouth in Zamboanga City in consideration of roughly RM 2.5M, approximately P25 million at current exchange rate.” At any rate, Gen. Libarnes concludes, the “arms shipment of MILF brought by those foreign committee members to submit to Objective No. 3 re abandoning demand for separate statehood.


“The Southern Command (Southcom) through the 6th Infantry Division (6th ID PA), as lead role, the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions of the Philippine Army, 2nd 3rd and 1st Marine Brigades and para-military units shall siege, attack and neutralize Camps Abubakar, Rajah Mudah, Bader and Darapanan in the Maguindanao province, Camp Bushra in Lanao del Sur and Camp Bilal in Lanao del Norte.

This shall be done in three (3) phases:

“On Phase I (Proactive):

a. identification of areas controlled or affected by the MILF.

b. Identification of MILF supply/reinforcement and withdrawal routes.

c. Identification and pinpointing enemy heavy gun placement, armory and main communication facilities.

d. Identification of enemy types of bunkers, fortifications, combat tactics and battle formation, anti-tank/armored vehicle barricades.

e. Identification of personalities, politicians, groups or entities having resentment against the MILF, and/or pro-MILF.

Presently, the AFP strength deployed in the AOR of Southcom is about 39,000 officers and men or 56.53% of the total AFP forces. Confidential reports furnished to this Task Force by Southcom chief M/GEN. DIOMEDIO P. VILLANUEVA, AFP bared the largest AFP Area Command is in control of three Army Divisions, 15 Army Brigades, three Marine Brigades, 44 Army Battalions, eight Marine Battalion Landing Teams, 13 Specialized Battalions, and 35 Special Forces Companies. This great force excludes the 10,000-strong CAFGUs and 5,000-strong MNLF integrees organized under the 3rd Special Rifle Company who are now vigorously pursuing their former comrades in the MILF. The leadership of 6th Infantry Division in the implementation of Oplan Mindanao II is excellent, but he possibility of effectively commanding such a huge army by one man is already doubtful. Other satellite camps of the MILF far from Camp Abubakar must be eliminated first to isolate it when all camps are completely overran and wrested by the AFP. With the capture of Camp Bilal in Lanao del Norte recently, Camp Bushra in Lanao del Sur is already vulnerable to the force of the 4th Infantry Division under B/Gen. Roy A. Cimatu, AFP. For your quick reference of our strength, the 6th ID is in control of 15-(,)000 officers and men making it the largest army division in the country in terms of AOR and strength. This strength alone is enough to compound the MILF major and satellite camps anytime the government wants to. Hence, no reinforcement from the 5th Infantry Division is necessary to wipe out the 12,000-strong MILF.

Phase I has already been done successfully. MILF areas are all verified by our negotiating panel which gave us the exact delineation of the camps and the projected MILF forces on those camps. Activities A to D were accomplished ahead of the target. Engr. Zamzamin Ampatuan (formerly holding high-ranking offices in DTI-ARMM, the UNDP and ILO in Cotabato City) and his cohorts, i.e. Kautin “Rohamin Hanok”, Abubakar “Bobby” Katambak, Nasser Ali, Bara Sema Kudong, Abduljalil Rayhan, and Engr. Nasser Sinarimbo – all slaves of Col. Victor N. Corpus, PA; Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Pinol; South Cotabato Governor Hilario de Pedro III; Gen. Santos City Mayor Adelbert Antonino; former Cotabatox x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x submarines found their way to Camp Abubakar before distributed in different MILF camps and controlled areas in the provinces of Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and a few units in Palawan.

“On Phase II (Reactive):


b. Conduct of increased military warfare and psychological warfare/operations.

c. Conduct of military advance training on anti-guerrilla warfare under the disguise of “BALIKATAN 2000” RP-US military training exercises, in consonance with the ratified Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

d. Increase pressure on the hardline MILF Central Committee members to drop Islamic State demand.

e.  To grant ethnic groups Political Identity, in consonance with the activation of the Invisible War.

f. Increased Political Strategy both on local and international fronts.”

The implementation of Activities A and B must be delayed for another three (3) months pending the conclusion of the GRP-MILF peace negotiations. The government must seize the opportunity when big development projects are going on extensively in MILF camps before the AFP launches an all-out strike against MILF camps. In the meantime, development programs for MILF camps and forward political negotiations must be first and second priorities of the Activity A. The siege or invasion of the camp may come later after first two activities are fully implemented. Likewise, postwar operations must be intensified by the AFP before increasing military warfare against the MILF. Knowledge gained from the “Balikatan 2000” is already enough for the AFP to apply it against the MILF rebels. Any future VFA-related activity must be exchange of intelligence and military information and not military exercises.

However, our policy on the VFA must be reviewed thoroughly in the light of present discovery of the “MILF-CIA Arms Deal.” If the intention of our American counterparts is to help us suppress the Moro and communist insurgencies, then the illicit arms deal should be immediately stopped by US Defense Secretary William Cohen. The infamous “Iran-Contra Arms Deal” must not be repeated in a Philippine setting, else the sincerity of the CIA would be an acid test. With this test of US (in)sincerity, the National Security Council must adept new plans, methods and strategies in finding other sources of our military hardware, i.e. Singapore, Britain.

The NSC must also look into the report of Gen. Libarnes that the Chinese Embassy in Manila is conduct of the CPP-NPA-NDF and MILF/MNLF in their foreign commando warfare and intelligence trainings. Gen. Libarnes also alleged that the growing number of AK-47 assault rifles of the NPAs and MNLFs come from China. He also treated the matter seriously saying China and the United States are planning to invade Southeast Asia through the infiltration of Spratly Islands and thereafter create chaos in the region. The US forces from South Korea and eventually Japan will make a mockery of events by taking over the political administration of the Philippines like what they did during the Second World War. This allegation must not be set aside since all elements of possibilities are significant.

In our view, only very few members of the MILF central committee are not yet convinced by our “Pressure Group” to forget the demand for a “Islamic State.” Convincing the local and international bodies such as the Organization of Islamic Conference to stop supporting the Muslim secessionism in the South.

“On Phase III (Consolidation):

a. Continue the supervision of the smooth implementation of the three phases of strategy.

b. Perform other related tasks.”

While this phase III remains as it is, it must go on its extended course as recommended in this paper.


1. The 6th infantry division (6th ID PA) will lead the simultaneous, massive and continuos attacks on Camp Abubakar on the Maguindanao Province side of the MILF enclave supported by the 3rd Marine Brigade, while the 4th Infantry Division will assault on the Lanao del Sur side of the Camp.

2. Other military units augmented by the 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army will assault other camps in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte.”

The latest statistics of AFP contained the Roster of Officers and Stations List (as of January 1, 2000). furnished by Gen. Libarnes revealed the 6th ID is in complete control of 14,925 officers and men or 21.94% of AFP strength. The 6th ID commands nine (9) Army Brigades and two (2) Marine Brigades comprising 24 Army Battalions and seven (7) MBLTs. On the other hand, the 4th ID now controls 6,500 officers and men distributed into three (3) Army Brigades, the 1st Marine Brigade, 12 Army Battalions and one MBLT. Yesterday’s entry in Gen. Santos City 61B and 71B elements from 30-2nd Bde, 3rd ID forces under Mindanao war hero M/Gen. Santos B. Gabison, Jr., AFP will already aggravate the Moro rebellion in Mindanao. The projected deployment of 5th ID forces in Cagayan de Oro City needs to be reassessed in the context of national security with specific reference to communist controlled areas in Luzon and Visayas, and the vulnerability of Metro Manila against NPA urban guerrillas and unprecedented coup d’etat to be staged by junior officers of AFP who were dissatisfied with the leadership of CSAFP Gen. Reyes and DND Secretary Mercado on the handling of the MILF rebellion. In short, the combined strength of 4th ID and 6th ID (21,500 officers and men) are twice the number of MILF forces or more than enough to humiliate in the next round of all-out offensives against their camps. Hence, Task No. 2 must be temporarily suspended pending assessment of war damages inflicted against the joint MILF-MNLF secessionist forces in some parts of Maguindanao, Cotabato and Lanao del Sur.


A. Lateral coordination among tasked units and government line agencies is highly encouraged.

B. Utilization of CAAs/CVOs during tactical movements.

C.  ‘HOLD TO THE GROUND, N REINFORCEMENT’ policy during enemy attack at night.

D. Assaulting units when attacking during night time must be equipped with US-supplied night vision goggles, to ensure accomplishment of any objective, and to minimize casualties. Priority targets for night vision goggles using troops are the heavy gun placements, rocketeers, radiomen, and strategic enemy positions in which to breakthrough at unexpected route.”

These instructions should remain standing. The Task Force suggests the addition of instruction regarding the MNLF integree and trainees in the Army and PNP. They must serve as advance forces in every operation against the MILF granting they were residents of war zones and relatives of the MILF forces. Their knowledge of the terrain, people, languages, and familiarity with the MILF movements (both use guerrilla warfare method) will enable us to control the situation in every skirmish. Anyway, Regional Governor Nur Misuari is happy upon learning that the MNLF integrees are doing well in every fight against MILF. Somehow, he is unhappy that his forces are fighting their own brothers in faith.


The Task Force Black Crescent recommends the following as long term solutions to defuse the prevailing tension brought about the Moro rebellion in Mindanao:

1. The government issues a 24-hour suspension of military operations (Somo) order against MILF rebels pending back channel negotiations regarding the re-declaration of the September 1997 GRP-MILF Ceasefire Agreement forged in Cagayan de Oro City. This will give our forces a break in the seven-week intense fighting   against MILF rebels in Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and Cotabato City, North Cotabato, South Cotabato and Gen. Santos City, Basilan, and Sarangani.
2. The GRP and MILF peace panels must forge another ceasefire truce not on the usual “as is, where is” principle but on “status quo ante bellum starting March 10, 2000 prior to the eruption of the war in Kauswagan.”
3. In responding to people’s and church’s demand to resolve the problem peacefully, the government must initiate moves to convince the leadership of MILF to lift their “unilateral, indefinite suspension” of the GRP-MILF peace negotiations. There is no better a price for a bloody war than a gift of peace, and that is through negotiations “with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity to all.” Asking the MILF to “lay down their arms and surrender their camps before the government agrees to a ceasefire” is next to impossible as this frustrated former President Fidel V. Ramos before he began the GRP-MILF talks and that there had already been a ceasefire agreement honored on its breach than on its implementation by both the GRP/AFP and MILF/BIAF.
4. Full and sincere implementation of the letter and intent of the Aide Memoire forged by the GRP and MILF Peace Panels in Cotabato City on 27 April 2000 renormalizing the situation along the Narciso Ramos Highway.
5. The president must heed the calls of the different sectors of the society to “lift the June 30 deadline on the conclusion of the peace talks with the MILF” as this is fast becoming impractical due to the present stand-off of AFP-MILF forces in Mindanao. The correct approach setting deadlines to the talks is what former Indonesian former minister Ali Alatas brilliantly opined at the start of the GRP-MNLF talks in Indonesia: “the duration of the negotiations will take what it requires but not more than necessary.”
6. The government may request the active presence of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Philippine National Red Cross during this time of heavy fighting against the Muslim rebels. They will play the role of Medical Peace Corps of the government, the Muslim rebels and the civilians.
7. The deployment of the 4,000-strong 1st Marine Brigade in Lanao del Norte and the 2nd and 3rd Marine Brigades in Maguindanao must be reassessed if the real of the government is to effect long term solutions to the Moro rebellion. Likewise, the deployment of 301st, 302nd, 303rd, 501st, 701st 103rd Brigades in the AOR of 6th ID must be reviewed in the light of prevailing situations where the MILF is only gaining symphatizers and supporters from both local and outside connections.  The de-militarization of Mindanao could contribute to a climate of stable peace and order condition and the economic recovery of Mindanao resulting from the abrupt pulling out of domestic and foreign investors for obvious reasons detrimental to their business interests.

8. The AFP must temporary suspend the arming of the Alliance of Christian Vigilantes for Muslim-free Mindanao and the Spiritual Soldiers of God in Mindanao since the arms distributed secretly rose already to 20,763 units consisting of M14s and M16s.   The AFP must now concentrate in solving the secessionist and insurgency problems peacefully and not worsen it through massive militarization.

9. The government must suspend the P7.8B AFP Modernization Program for 2000 and instead spend the money in payment of foreign debt, building of health infrastructures, schools, highways, bridges, dams, irrigations, modernization of airports and seaports, and others designed to uplift the condition of the masses in support of Erap para sa Mahirap Program. This amount should be added to the present Philippine sovereign debt payment amounting to US$ 82,828,365,850.00 (P3,478,791,366,000.00).
Further, the additional budget sought by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Reyes amounting P800M a year for the activation of 33,000 CAFGUs in Mindanao must scrapped to defuse the brewing tension in Mindanao posed by the Muslim rebels. The county’s national security and diplomatic relations with the Muslim world must be a top priority agenda of the government as a peaceful solution to the Mindanao Problem. This corroborates the President’s May 5 nationwide statement that “We are prepared not only to talk peace but to build a peace founded on sincerity and mutual trust. We continue to undertake comprehensive programs for reform that address the legitimate grievances of Mindanao.”    The P1.4B budget for FY 2000 of the AFP for the war in Mindanao must be scrutinized well by the Senate because of the reports that the AFP Generals involved in the war in the South are already getting richer and richer, and that the problem is getting from bad to worse and not really getting solved as planned by the NSC.
10. The government must understand that the MILF and Abu Sayyaf are two opposing poles: one secessionist while the other bandit and terrorist. In suppressing them, the government must draw the line between a military offensive and a police action for both have different characteristics.
11. The Blue Ribbon Committee of the Senate must investigate ARMM Regional Governor and MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, RLS Speaker Kabilan Sema, SKSRC-MNLF Chairman Datu Dimalao “Alladin” Ambel, DENR-ARMM Regional Secretary    Faizal “Randy” Karon, DOST-ARMM Regional Secretary Hamim “Alfatah” Abubakar, DILG-ARMM Regional Secretary Abduljabbar “Narra” Abduljalil, and Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin Sema from openly manifesting their support to the MILF rebellion in utter violation of the September 2, 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.

12. Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon must be investigated by the Committee on Blue Ribbon, Defense and National Security and Foreign Relations sitting jointly on the expose of M/Gen. Libarnes regarding illicit relations of MILF-MNLF in arms deal with foreign Muslim heads of state and their missions in Metro Manila.   Furthermore, Secretary Siazon must be investigated on his betrayal on the Constitution and treasonous act when he tolerated the United States government and the Chinese Embassy in selling large quantity of arms to the NPA, MILF and MNLF in due disregard of the Visiting Forces Agreement. His investigation may compel the Embassies of the United States, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in Manila to divulge top secret documents regarding long existing arms deal with the MILF.

13. The Committee on Blue Ribbon, Defense and National Security and Foreign Relations sitting jointly must investigate Southcom commanding general Lt. Gen. Diomedio P. Villanueva, AFP M/Gen. Gregorio M. Camiling, Jr., division commander of 6th ID in Maguindanao, B/Gen. Roy A. Cimatu, AFP, division commander of 4th ID in Cagayan de Oro City, and former CGPA Lt. Gen. Raul S. Urgello, AFP, on the P25M-deal on arms  shipment for the MILF. Similarly, M/Gen. Libarnes must be summoned before the joint committee for cross examination on his expose report submitted before this Task Force.

Finally, the Task Force is deemed dissolved effective May 15, 2000 upon the expiration of its term of office mandated under this unnumbered Executive Order “creating Task Force Black Crescent as think tank of the government, specifically of Malacanang, the Department of National Defense and the National Security Council, tasked to formulate long term solutions to the MILF rebellion, and for other purposes.”
Respectfully submitted,

Gen. Fortunato U. Abat, AFP (ret.)

Chairman, TF Black Crescent

Former Secretary, National defense

Former Chairman, GRP peace Panel on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks

Gen. Renato S. De Villa

Co-Chairman, TF Black Crescent

Former Secretary, National Defense

Former Adviser, GRP Peace Panel on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks

Lt. Gen. Orlando V. Soriano (Ret.)

Member, TF Black Crescent

Former Chairman, GRP Peace Panel on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks

M/Gen. Santos B. Gabison,Jr., AFP

Member, TF Black Crescent

Former Member, GRP Negotiating Panel

Amb. Manuel T. Yan

Adviser, TF Black Crescent

Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

1. “The MILF Connections Report” by M/Gen. Benjamin Libarnes, AFP submitted to the TF Black Crescent, 34 pages.

2. “Confidential Report on MILF-CIA Arms Deal” furnished to TF Black Crescent by the MOSSAD Headquarters in Tel Aviv, 51 pages.

3. “Draft List of Government Officials Supporting the MILF” furnished to TF Black Crescent by Davao City Mayor Benjamin de Guzman, President of the Confederation of Governors and City Mayors in Mindanao, 3 pages.

4. “Roster of Officers and Station List of AFP, 2000” furnished to TF Black Crescent by CSAFP Gen. Angelo T. Reyes, AFP, 543 pages.



The date posted here is due to our website rebuild, it does not reflect the original date this article was posted. This article was originally posted in Yonip on Nov. 6th 2002


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