[Paper presented during
the SEACSN Conference 2004: “Issues and Challenges for Peace and Conflict
Resolution in Southeast Asia”, at Shangri-La Hotel, Penang, Malaysia on
12-15 January 2004.]
MUSLIM
MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Abhoud Syed M. Lingga
Executive Director,
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies
How the Muslims as a
minority situate themselves within the Philippine national community is the
subject of discussion in this paper. A look into their views on their
relations with the national community is necessary in understanding the
conflict in Mindanao for this is the impetus in their assertion for their
right to self-determination.
Minority Communities
We find
minority communities within the borders of many countries today. These
minority communities can be classified broadly into three major categories
(Che Man 1990:1). The minority migrant populations are in the first
category. During the colonial period, workers were recruited from other
colonies to work in plantations, mining and other industries. In recent
years, migration of peoples who are induced by pull factors like economic
opportunities and liberal policies of countries of destination and the push
factors in their own countries like violent conflicts, lack of economic
opportunities and repressive government policies are observable. The migrant
populations have no attachment to any portion of the territory of the host
country. Their concerns are the acceptability by and equal rights with the
dominant majority, and equal access to social services and economic
opportunities.
The second
category is the indigenous peoples who became minority in their homelands as
the result of colonial settlements. There are around 300 million of them in
more than seventy countries. These peoples have retained their social,
cultural, economic and political way of life but face the threat of being
assimilated with the majority populations. The aspirations of the
indigenous peoples are to ‘exercise control over their own institutions,
ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their
identities, languages and religions, within the framework of the States in
which they live’ (International Labor Organization 1989).
Peoples who
were incorporated into the new nation-states after the departure of the
colonial powers are under the third category. Before colonization these
peoples had their political institutions, administrative system, and trade
and international relations with other countries. Colonial intrusions in
their territories were not welcomed and often met with resistance. When the
colonial powers granted independence to their colonies the territories of
these peoples were incorporated into the new nation-states. In some cases,
their territories became parts of more than one country. With their history
of political independence and distinct way of life, these peoples claim they
belong to different nations from the majority. Their identities are always
link to their traditional homeland. They feel uncomfortable living within
the borders of the new nation-states, which they perceived as
successor-in-interest of the colonial powers, and relish the memory of their
long history of political independence that they want to revive in order to
establish system of life in accordance with their world view, culture,
religion and social norms.
Identity and Homeland
The Muslims in the
Philippines consist of thirteen ethno-linguistics groups: Iranun,
Magindanaon, Maranao, Tao-Sug, Sama, Yakan, Jama Mapun, Ka'agan, Kalibugan,
Sangil, Molbog, Palawani and Badjao. There are also Muslims among the other
indigenous peoples of Mindanao like the Teduray, Manobo, Bla-an, Higaonon,
Subanen, T'boli, and others. In recent years, significant number of people
from Luzon and Visayas and migrant communities in Mindanao converted to
Islam.
The Muslims who
traditionally inhabited Mindanao, the islands of Basilan and Palawan, and
the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi archipelago in the south of the Philippines identify
themselves as Bangsamoro. The name Moro was given by the Spanish colonizers
to the Muslims in Mindanao whom they found to have the same religion and way
of life with the Muslims of North Africa who ruled the Iberian Peninsula for
centuries. The Malay word bangsa, which means nation, was prefixed to
suggest distinct nationhood. The term has find place in official documents
of the Organization of Islamic Conference (2001) and agreements between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF).1
The homeland of the
Bangsamoro people consisted of the territories under the jurisdiction of
their governments before the emergence of the Philippine state. At the
height of its power, the Sulu Sultanate exercised sovereignty over the
present day provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan, Basilan and the Malaysian
state of Sabah (North Borneo). The territory of the Magindanaw Sultanate
included Maguindanao province, the coastal areas of the provinces of Sultan
Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani, parts of Lanao provinces, Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental, and the eastern part of Zamboanga del Sur. The Datu
Dakula of Sibugay, who ruled the Sibugay autonomous region under the
Magindanaw Sultanate, exercised jurisdiction over Zamboanga del Norte,
Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga City and the western part of Zamboanga del Sur.
The Rajah of Buayan ruled North Cotabato, the upper valley of Maguindanao
and the interior areas of Sultan Kudarat and South Cotabato and some parts
of Bukidnon. The Pat a Pangampong ko Ranao (confederation of the four
lake-based emirates) ruled the interior parts of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, and parts of Bukidnon, Agusan, and eastern and western Misamis
provinces. The small sultanate of Kabuntalan separates the domains of
Magindanaw and Buayan.
As the result of the
colonial policy of the Philippine government to reduce the Bangsamoro into
minority by encouraging Filipino settlers from the north to settle in their
traditional homeland, the Bangsamoro are now confined in the provinces of
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, and some
municipalities of Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte,
Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani,
Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostela Valley and
Palawan. Although their territory was significantly reduced but the
Bangsamoro people continuously assert their right over their homeland, which
gain implied recognition of the government.2
Ties with the Muslim
World
From the
formation of the Muslim community in Mindanao and Sulu up to the middle of
the twentieth century the ties of the Muslims in the Philippines with the
Muslim world was through the Muslims in Southeast Asian. This was because of
the important role played by some members of the ruling families in the
region in the expansion of Islam in the Philippines. The fact that the
Bangsamoro homeland and people are parts of dunia Melayu, and they
have common religion andshared many cultural practices with the
Muslims in the region explains this close ties. The geographic location of
Mindanao and Sulu, which are strategically located along the trade route,
facilitated contact and communication with other Muslim principalities in
the region. In fact, Jolo was a bustling trading center before the Spanish
colonizers founded Manila. Their contacts with Arab, Persian and Indian
Muslims were limited to traders and missionaries who came for visits,
although some stayed after marrying local women.
The coming of Islam to
the Philippines according to Majul (1999: 39-84) was an instance of the
Islamization of the Malay world in Southeast Asia. By the end of thirteenth
century there was already a settlement or colony of foreign Muslims in Sulu
who were composed probably of the families of Muslim traders and
missionaries who married local women and few converts (Majul 1999: 68). When
Islam actually arrived in Mindanao and Sulu is quite difficult to determine
at this time, but its expansion happened after members of ruling families in
Sumatra and Johore arrived and founded political institutions that
facilitated conversion of large population. The first Sultan of Sulu with
the title of Paduka Mahasari Maulana al-Sultan Sharif ul-Hashim, whose reign
was estimated between 1450 and 1480, was reported in Sulu tarsilas to
have come from Sumatra. He married the daughter of Rajah Baguinda who
arrived earlier in Sulu from Menangkabaw. Sharif ul-Hashim established in
Sulu the political institution of sultanate. In Mindanao, Sharif Muhammad
Kabungsuwan, who founded the Magindanaw sultanate, arrived on the shores of
Mindanao around 1515. According to Magindanaw tarsilas he was the son
of Sharif ‘Ali Zein ul-‘Abidin from Arabia and his mother belonged to the
royal family of Johore.
Tracing descent from the
ruling families in the region facilitated marriage alliances that provided
another connection. Sources both in Sulu and Brunei show that Sulu seventh
sultan Muhammad ul-Halim was related to the Brunei royal family. The mother
of Sultan Badar ud-Din I was a Tirun from the northeast coast of Borneo. If
intermarriages happened among royal families who were traditionally
protective of their bloodline to maintain their legitimacy to rule, we can
assume that there were intermarriages also among those in the middle and
lower classes of society. These intermarriages cemented political alliances.
When Spanish governor Corcuera attacked Sulu in 1638 Rajah Bongsu, the Sulu
Sultan, was helped by Makassar warriors. The Ternatans often assisted Sultan
Buisan of Magindanaw in his war against colonial intrusion.
In state formation, the
political institutions in neighboring principalities heavily influenced the
sultanates. Nomenclatures of positions were similar with most Malay states.
Aside from the sultan the other positions in the Sulu sultanate were the
Datu Bendahara, Datu Maharajah-lela, Datu Juhan Pahlawan, Datu Muluk
Bandarasa, Datu Sebalmal, Datu Tumanggung, Datu Mamamsha, Datu Amir Bahar,
Munnabil ‘Alam and Datu Sawajahan (Majul 1999: 390-91). The sultan
exercised the executive functions together with the abovementioned office
holders who composed the cabinet. The Ruma Bichara performed
functions of a legislative body. The qadi (locally known as datu
kali) headed the justice department. Workable political and
administrative systems in Sulu, Magindanaw, Buayan and even in the
confederation of the lake-based principalities of the Maranaos were in
placed which were important factors in the sultanates movement towards
centralization of powers and in the resistance against Spanish colonization.
Although the
claims of descent from Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the ruling
families in the region, which were prominently featured in all tarsilas,
was primarily to establish legitimacy of rule, it showed, at least on the
level of the ruling families, awareness that the Bangsamoro people belonging
to the global Ummah. This consciousness manifested also in traditional
khutbah, read during Friday and ‘id congregational prayers, that
included not only prayers for the reigning sultans but also for the Caliph
of the Ummah. This suggested that the sultanates in Mindanao and Sulu
recognized the Caliph’s leadership and they were parts of the Muslim world.
Before the
popularization of the Arabic language, religious books in Mindanao and Sulu
were mostly in Malay language written in jawi scripts. This explains
the fact that religious practices at that time were greatly influenced by
religious practices in other parts of the Malay world. Only the few learned
were literate in Arabic language so Malay religious literatures were more
accessible to many.
After the Philippines got
its independence in 1946 and Mindanao and Sulu were made part of the new
nation-state, link with the Muslim world gradually shifted to the Middle
East. This started with admission of students from Mindanao to Al Azhar
University in Cairo. The Arab petrodollars provided scholarships to many
students studying in Middle East universities, who after finishing their
studies came home as paid missionaries of religious institutions, and
established madaris and Qur’anic schools that teach what they learned
of Islam. The curricula of these madaris are patterned after the
curricula of the institutions where the founder graduated. Graduates of
Islamic universities are often looked up to in their communities as
religious leaders and opinion makers.
Consequently, religious
thoughts in the Middle East gradually influence religious practices in
Mindanao and Sulu. Active da’wah programs of religious institutions
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Arab countries reinforced this trend. With
the generous support from charitable institutions and philanthropic
individuals more mosques and madaris were built.
Even Islamic reform
movements in the Middle East and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent have
influence on Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu. Syed Qutb of the Muslim
Brotherhood and Syed Abul A’la Maududi of Jamaat Islamie for example had
profound influence on the political thought of Salamat Hashim, founder and
head of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front until his death in July 2003,
which seeks separate state for the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu (Lingga
1995: 26). These two reform movements excelled in their education programs
and expectedly their ideas are transmitted to many parts of the world.
The strong
ties with the Ummah work in favor of the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu.
After reports of massacres and other atrocities committed against Muslims
reached the media in early seventies, Libya reacted immediately and led the
move to bring the case to the attention of the OIC, which expressed
during the Third Islamic Conference
of Foreign Ministers
‘serious concern over the plight of Muslims living in the Philippines’
(1972). Libya, aside from being the host, played significant role in the
signing of the 1976 Tripoli agreement between the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government. Indonesia played active role in
the concluded negotiations between the government and the MNLF and Malaysia
is mediating in the on-going peace talks between the government and the
MILF.
Contrasting Views
After
independence was granted to the Philippines by the United States, the Muslim
territories in Mindanao and Sulu became part of the Philippines.
Accordingly, the government considers them Filipino citizens, including
those fighting the government. Reflective of this policy is President
Ferdinand E. Marcos’ (1977) statement in his report to the Batasang Bayan
that the government ‘consider(s) the MNLF citizens of the Republic even if
they are in rebellion.’ As such, he emphasized that agreements with the
liberation movements are agreements between the Philippine Government and
its own nationals.
They have equal rights
and obligations with other Filipinos. Their communities are subdivided into
local units just like other parts of the country. Muslims are elected to
positions in local governments in areas where they are in majority and
appointed to manage local bureaucracy. There were few who were elected in
the Senate before and representation in the House of Representatives is
always assured because congressmen are elected by district although they are
not many. There are also Muslims who are appointed to positions in the
national bureaucracy and in the judiciary.
There is no government
policy that clearly discriminate Muslims, but policies are formulated in
response to popular demand. And since majority of the populations are
Christians, policies can be biased in favor of the majority. There are also
policies and programs that are meant to reinforce the position of government
but they work against the interest of the Muslims. For example, in the name
of development Christians from the north were encouraged to settle in
Mindanao resulting to the minoritization of the Muslims in many parts of
their traditional homeland
On the other
hand, the Muslims view their situation in different way. Muhammad al-Hasan
(Quoted by Gowing 1978: 78) articulates this view in these words:
We
[Moros and Filipinos] are two different peoples adhering to different
ideologies, having different cultures, and nurtured by different historical
experiences.
We
have contradistinct conceptions of sovereignty. The Filipinos believe that
sovereignty resides in them, but we believe that sovereignty belongs to God
alone. The political, social, economic and judicial institutions they
inherited from the colonizers, organized on the basis of the separation of
spiritual and mundane aspects of life, are incongruous with ours which are
established on the postulates that life is a unity, God is the Sovereign and
man is His vicegerent.
Our
culture, imbued with Islamic beliefs, tenets and principles, is
diametrically in contrast with what is known today as Filipino culture which
is the amalgamation of the residues of the colonizers’ cultures. Our art,
architecture, literature and music have retained their Asian character
[which] is not true [of] theirs.
The Muslims claim they
belong to a separate nation by virtue of their distinct identity and long
history of political independence. Following the nationalist theory of
secession, they also claim that they have ‘a right to self-determination,
including the right to a state’, at least in areas where they are in
majority (Buendia 2002: 9). Their experience in state formation and
resistance against colonial rule are often cited as bases of their claim for
separate nation and state. The Spanish colonial government attempted to
conquer the sultanates to subjugate their political existence and to add
their territory to the Spanish colonies in the Philippine Islands but there
was no significant success. The sultanates with their organized maritime and
infantry forces succeeded in defending the Muslim territories during what
Majul (1999: 121-372) called Moro wars, thus preserving the continuity of
their independence.
The Muslims’ resistance
against attempts to subjugate their independence continued even when US
forces occupied some areas in Mindanao and Sulu. At this time the resistance
of the Muslim governments was not as fierce as during the Moro-Spanish wars
but group-organized guerrilla attacks against American forces and
installations reinforced what remained of the sultanates' military power.
Even individual Muslim showed defiance against American occupation of their
homeland by attacking American forces in operations called prang sabil
(martyrdom operation).
When the U.S. government
promised independence to the Filipinos, the Muslim leaders registered their
strong objection to be part of the Republic of the Philippines. In the
petition to the U.S. President, the people of Sulu archipelago said that
they would prefer being part of the U.S. rather than to be included in an
independent Philippine nation (Jubair 1999: 293-7).
In their Declaration of
Rights and Purposes, the Muslim leaders meeting in Zamboanga on February 1,
1924, proposed that the ‘Islands of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of
Palawan be made an unorganized territory of the United States of America’
(Jubair 1999:298-03), in anticipation that in the event the U.S. would
decolonize its colonies and other non-self governing territories the
Bangsamoro homeland would be granted separate independence. Had it happened,
the Muslims would have regained by now their independence under the UN
declaration on decolonization. Their other proposal was that if independence
had to be granted including the Muslim territories, fifty years after
Philippine independence a plebiscite be held in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan
to decide by vote whether the territory would be incorporated in the
government of the Islands of Luzon and Visayas, remain a territory of the
United States, or become independent. The fifty-year period ended in 1996,
the same year the MNLF and the Philippine government signed the Final
Agreement on the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. The leaders warned
that if no provision of retention under the United States were made, they
would declare an independent constitutional sultanate to be known as Moro
Nation.
Even after their
territories were made part of the Philippine republic in 1946, the Muslims
continue to assert their right to independence. They consider the annexation
of their homeland as illegal and immoral since it was done without their
plebiscitary consent. Their assertions manifest in many forms.
The armed resistance of
Kamlon, Jikiri and Tawan-Tawan were signs of protests for being part of the
Philippine republic. Those who joined the Philippine government used the new
political system they were in to pursue the vision of regaining
independence. Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa, for example, filed House Bill
No. 5682 during the fourth session of the Fourth Congress that sought the
granting and recognition of the independence of Sulu (Jubair 1999: 304-05).
As expected, the bill found its way to the archive of Congress since there
were few Muslim members of Congress. Then on May 1, 1968, the then
provincial governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam, made a dramatic move by
issuing the Mindanao Independence Movement manifesto calling for the
independence of Mindanao and Sulu to be known and referred to as the
Republic of Mindanao and Sulu (Jubair 1999: 306-07).
Independence Movement
Buendia (2002: 11)
observes that the ‘Muslims in the Philippines, at first, took the peaceful
track in carving the nation-state.’ When it became evident to them that it
would not be possible to regain independence within the framework of the
Philippine legal system, the MNLF was organized to lead the armed struggle.
The MNLF objective then was for separate state but upon the prodding of the
Organization of Islamic Conference it signed the Tripoli Agreement on
December 23, 1976 that binds it to accept autonomy within the framework of
Philippine territory. Nur Misuari’s acceptance of autonomy triggered debate
within the MNLF that ultimately led to the separation of a faction known
later on as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The MILF vowed to pursue the
original objective of the MNLF for separate state but this time only in
areas where the Muslims are in majority. If we look at the population
distribution in Mindanao, this will include the provinces of Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu, Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, the cities of Marawi, Cotabato
and Isabela. In addition, there are towns in other provinces where the
Muslims are in majority. Some are contiguous with the five provinces others
are not.
The clamor for separate
state is not only among the liberation fronts but includes the Muslim civil
society. While armed struggle remains one of the options of the liberation
fronts the civil society movement advocates peaceful and democratic approach
through a United Nations supervised referendum. The Bangsamoro People’s
Consultative Assembly met twice, in 1996 and 2001. The first assembly,
reportedly attended by more than one million people, came out with a
statement calling for reestablishment of the Bangsamoro state and government
(Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly 1996: 5-10). The declaration of
the second assembly, attended by around two and a half million participants
according to reports, states ‘the only just, meaningful, and permanent
solution to the Mindanao Problem is the complete independence of the
Bangsamoro people and the territories they now actually occupy from the
Republic of the Philippines’ (Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly
2001: 5).
The manifesto (1999)
issued by hundreds of thousands of Bangsamoro who participated in the Rally
for Peace and Justice in Cotabato City and Davao City on October 23, 1999,
in Marawi City on October 24, 1999 and in Isabela, Basilan on December 7,
1999 clearly states their position.
‘… we
believe that the only just, viable and lasting solution to the problem of
our turbulent relationship with the Philippine government is the restoration
of our freedom, liberty and independence which were illegally and
immorally usurped from us, and that we be given a chance to establish a
government in accordance with our political culture, religious beliefs and
social norms’.
The traditional leaders
had also expressed their strong desire for self-determination. The
Declaration of Intent and Manifestation of Direct Political Act (2001)
released by the datus headed by Magindanaw Sultan Abdul Aziz
Guiwan Mastura Kudarat IV calls for United Nations supervised referendum to
determine whether the Bangsamoro people want independence or not.
Government Response
To deflect
the issue on the rights of the Bangsamoro to self-determination, the
Philippine government admitted neglect. The government is insistent that the
problem is the absence of economic development. That is why within the span
of the administration of five presidents government efforts are always
focused on development of Mindanao.
The
Philippine government initiated negotiations with the MNLF in 1975 and with
the active involvement of Libya the framework on how to solve the problem
was reached in 1976. But it took more than two decades to negotiate the
implementing details of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. In 1996 with the active
mediation of Indonesia the final agreement between the government and the
MNLF was initialed in Jakarta and signed in Manila. Following the end of the
negotiations with the MNLF, the government started talking to the MILF.
After informal contacts, negotiations started on January 7, 1997. The MILF
pulled out from the negotiations in 2000 following the government all-out
war in Mindanao, but when President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the
presidency in 2001 she asked the assistance of Indonesia and Malaysia to
convince the MILF to resume the stalled talks. From then on Malaysia has
been hosting the talks between the government and the MILF. So far two
significant agreements were inked, agreements on cessation of hostilities
and agreement on rehabilitation of refugees and development of war-affected
areas. The on-going talks have yet to tackle the issue on ancestral domain
and the political status of the Bangsamoro people.
Before the final
agreement with the MNLF was reached, the government organized an autonomous
region as its own way of complying with the provisions of the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement. The 1987 constitution provides for the establishment of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera. With this
constitutional mandate Congress passed Republic Act 6734, the law governing
the creation and operations of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). In a plebiscite conducted on November 19, 1989, four provinces out
of the thirteen provinces mentioned in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement voted to
constitute the autonomous region. Later, amendments were introduced in the
ARMM Organic Act to accommodate provisions of the final agreement and one
province joined the autonomous region.
As transitory
mechanism from the signing of the final agreement on September 2, 1996 to
the amendments of the 1986 Organic Act of the autonomous region, the Special
Zone of Peace and Development (SPCPD) was created to provide basic services,
adequate infrastructure facilities, entrepreneurial support,
capability-building assistance to local government units, and to promote
investment and trade in the areas covered in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.
Both the ARMM and the SPCPD were placed under the control of the MNLF.
Even before
the MNLF rebellion, there were government programs designed to address the
problems of the Muslims as understood by political leaders and bureaucrats
in Manila. In 1957, the Commission on National Integration (CNI) was created
for the purpose of integrating the Muslims and other cultural minorities
into the body politic. The CNI was abolished and the Office on Muslim
Affairs was created in its place.
To promote
government program of education to accelerate the integration of the Muslims
into the body politic, the Mindanao State University was established in
Marawi City. The university serves as instrument of the government in the
development of the southern region. The Mindanao Development Authority (its
name was later changed to Southern Philippines Development Authority and
abolished last year) was created in 1961 to hasten the economic development
of Mindanao.
To appeal to
the religious sense of the Muslims, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines was decreed into law in 1977. These laws were extracted from
Islamic jurisprudence on person and family. Shariah courts were
subsequently organized in Muslim communities and Shariah judges were
appointed to adjudicate cases involving marriage and inheritance. The
Philippine Amanah Bank, with mandate to operate in accordance with Islamic
banking principles, was also established.
At the same
time that new policies and programs were introduced to appease the Muslims,
the government invoking its sovereign right to maintain its territorial
integrity unleashed its military might against the Muslims. Carolyn O.
Arguillas (2003) provides a vivid picture of the cost of the military
campaign.
In a
privilege speech in July 1996, then Rep. Eduardo Ermita, now Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process … citing data from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, showed how over a period of 26 years since 1970, more than
100,000 persons had been killed in the conflict in Mindanao, 30 per cent of
that government casualties, 50 per cent rebels and 20 per cent civilians.
Ermita
said 55,000 persons were injured, not counting those from the rebel side.
From 1970 to 1976 alone, he said, an average of 18 people were slain
everyday.
All in
all, Ermita said, the AFP spent P73 billion in the 26-year period, or an
average of 40 per cent of its annual budget.
In the year
2000 when government troops attacked the MILF camps, around 932,000
civilians were displaced from their homes. The World Bank (2003:12-13)
report shows that “Majority of people who were displaced as a result of the
conflict in Mindanao that erupted in 2000 were Muslims.” Around 390,000
people were again displaced when government troops attacked MILF enclaves in
Pikit and Pagalungan in February 2003.
Concluding
Observations
Within the
borders of the Philippines we find Muslim minorities who identify themselves
as Bangsamoro. They can be classified under the third category of minority
communities. Their experience in state formation predates the formation of
the Philippines as a state. They continue to occupy what remain of their
traditional homeland
Their problematic
relations with the national community, which oftentimes resulted to violent
confrontations, should be understood in the context of the principle of
self-determination. The feeling among the Bangsamoro people is strong that
the best guarantee for their security and the only opportunity that they can
organize their political life according to their values and way of life is
when they possess the medium of sovereign power. Issues of poverty,
underdevelopment, neglect and other social and economic inequities certainly
need attention but the core issue of the problem is their assertion for
their right to self-determination.
The
Bangsamoro have never live in isolation from their brothers and sisters
either in Southeast Asia or in the Middle East. They always relate
themselves with the Muslim world and their ties with global Ummah will
always remain, whether they differ or not in their understanding and
practice of Islam. In their quest for the assertion of their rights to
freedom and self-determination the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu will always
find sympathetic ears to listen to their aspirations at least from the
masses in the Ummah, if not from governments and organizations.
NOTES
1The
Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, otherwise known as the Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001, signed on June 22, 2001 in Tripoli, Libya,
unambiguously recognizes that identity. Examples are these provisions of the
agreement:
"Recognizing that peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF is for the
advancement of the general interest of the Bangsamoro people…"
(underline supplied)
"On
the aspect of ancestral domain, the Parties, in order to address the
humanitarian and economic needs of the Bangsamoro people and preserve
their social and cultural heritage and inherent right over their ancestral
domain, …" (underline supplied)
"The
observance of international humanitarian law and respect for internationally
recognized human rights instruments and the protection of evacuees and
displaced persons in the conduct of their relations reinforce the
Bangsamoro people's fundamental right to determine their own future and
political status." (underline supplied)
2In
the preamble of the Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, otherwise
known as the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001, signed on June 22, 2001 in
Tripoli, Libya, states that the GRP and the MILF are "Determined to
establish a peaceful environment and normal condition of life in the
Bangsamoro homeland" (emphasis supplied).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro
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