Oct 092014

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2008-03-18 08:24
2011-08-30 01:44
Embassy Tokyo

DE RUEHKO #0723/01 0780824
P 180824Z MAR 08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000723



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018

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Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (

Subject: CT Trilateral Border, Transport, and Maritime
Security Subgroup Update

¶1. (C) Summary: Government officials from Australia, Japan,
and the United States met in Tokyo on February 26 for the
Counterterrorism Trilateral Border, Transport, and Maritime
Security Sub-Group meeting. The meeting was chaired by Paul
Fujimura, Director for Asia-Pacific, Department of Homeland
Security. Participants discussed ways to step up regional
documentation training in Southeast Asia, measures to boost
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines Tri-border
capacity-building, and port security. Improving maritime
stability in Southeast Asia, the Philippines port project,
and strengthening border controls in Indonesia was also
discussed. All sides agreed that it would not be necessary
for the subgroup to meet again before the next
ambassador-level counterterrorism trilateral meeting. The
next ambassador-level CT meeting will be held in the United
States in mid-2008 but the dates have not been set. End

Regional Documentation Examination Training
¶2. (C) Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship
Senior Policy Advisor Katherine Taylor recommended
establishing an online CT trilateral steering committee to
enable CT trilateral counterparts to share information
directly via email communications. Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, International Security Division,
Counterterrorism Branch Executive Director Brek Batley and
Fujimura agreed this would be an important first step and
noted it would be important to identify who would receive
access and to identify what type of information would be
shared. Fujimura suggested sharing information on travel
patterns and red border fraud alerts such as the ICE Forensic
Document Lab’s (FDL) Document Alerts. Airline officers and
liaison officers, such as DHS Immigration Advisory Program
officials, could potentially be included at a later date,
Fujimura suggested.

¶3. (C) Ministry of Justice Immigration Policy Coordinator
Naomi Hirota provided an update on the thirteenth Document
Examination Seminar held in Tokyo in February 2008. Japan
has sponsored the seminar since 1995 to provide training on
detecting fraudulent documents, document swaps that occur in
airport transit lounges, and biometric immigration procedures
including finger scanning. Eleven countries participated in
the seminar this year, including one official from Burma.
Japan focused on the type of document fraud used by Iranians
since there has been a sharp increase in the number of
Iranians traveling on fraudulent documents, Hirota stated.

¶4. (C) Taylor led a discussion on the merits of document
training programs currently conducted by Australia, Japan,
and the United States. Providing laboratory equipment,
especially hand-held document examination kits, is an
important component of efforts to increase the capability of
officials at the border crossings and ports of entry to
detect fraud, observed Taylor. The goal of providing
document training programs to third countries is to create a
self-sustaining network of regional document fraud examiners
whereby trained officers can go on to train other officers in
their home countries without requiring continued assistance
from the country providing the initial training. For
example, when Australia provides document examination
training assistance to countries in Southeast Asia, it begins
with bilateral assistance with Australian nationals initially
teaching the course. As time goes on, the trainees learn to
teach the course themselves and are no longer dependent on
Australia for the training. Fujimura noted that the United
States has loaned 42 document examination kits to the
Philippines with the aim of preventing the kits from
disappearing, as has been the case with similar equipment
that was donated to the Philippines.

¶5. (C) Japan provides immigration control training seminars

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for Southeast Asian countries, Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs International Counterterrorism Cooperation Division
Director Fumio Shimizu noted. The training seminars cover
travel document security policy and the use of biometric
technology. Japan conducts the training seminars on a
multilateral basis, whereas Australia and the United States
usually provide similar training on a bilateral basis,
Shimizu explained. Shimizu told Fujimura that Japan would
welcome assistance from DHS on the training courses the
Government of Japan conducts in Tokyo.

¶6. (C) One of the challenges of providing multilateral
training, is to make sure the selected participants are at
the working level, and are the ones who will best benefit
from the training. DHS officials have noticed that when they
provide training courses in the United States to Southeast
Asian counterparts, senior officials want to participate to
benefit from “a free trip abroad” which prevents the line
officers, who will truly benefit from the training, from
being able to attend. It is also important to conduct the
training in the region, so that local participants will have
a “sense of ownership” over the training seminar, Fujimura

Tri-Border Capacity Building
¶7. (C) Clandestine intelligence reporting indicates Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines continue to be areas of
concern, Batley stated. At the Counterterrorism Trilateral
held in Sydney last June, there was agreement to boost
information sharing among appropriate government agencies
from Australia, Japan, and the U.S. The U.S. agreed to set
up a matrix of partner activities. This matrix is currently
under development and will help boost bilateral and
trilateral cooperation by reducing redundancy, he noted.
While this matrix is still under development, it is still a
key deliverable that demonstrates CT trilateral efforts,
Batley stated, adding Australia will organize an additional
meeting on this in Jakarta soon. Our embassies are talking
with one another but we need to ramp it up and move beyond
information sharing to improved coordination, Batley

8 (C) Japan has experience working with Southeast Asian
maritime agencies in a bid to boost security, Shimizu stated.
Japan co-sponsored the Japan-ASEAN Counterterrorism Dialogue
at the Ambassador-level starting in 2006 and maritime
security was at the top of the agenda. Indonesia was
initially on board with this, but later abandoned it, Shimizu
explained. Maritime security, particularly PSI, is a
particularly sensitive issue for Indonesia, agreed Batley.
There is still room for Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to
coordinate, however.

¶9. (C) U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander Yuri Graves
provided an update on the USCG International Port Security
Program and Australian Embassy Customs Counsellor Robert
Rushby provided an update on the Australian Coastwatch South.
Over the last eighteen months, the Australian Customs
Service (including Border Protection Command) and Australia’s
Department of Defense have been working with the Philippine’s
Defense and border agencies to help implement an integrated
civil and defense solution to improve maritime security and
border controls, particularly in the south of the
Philippines, and this initiative is known as Coast Watch
South (CWS). The goals of CWS include helping the
Philippines prepare a robust framework for interagency
coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain, to
provide subject matter expertise and learning opportunities
to share experiences on how to implement an approach to
address threats in the maritime domain, and to help the
Philippines identity future needs to “operationalize” CWS.
With the Philippine navy as the lead, other participating
agencies include the Philippine Coast Guard, Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, Philippine National Police, Bureau of
Customs, Bureau of Immigration, and the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources.

¶10. (SBU) Since the Philippine navy has the official lead on

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CWS, requests for the release of information from the United
States and Japan, including requests for copies of the draft
executive order, along with any offers to donate or provide
support to CWS, should be directed to Commander Wenefredo B
Banua of the Philippine Army, Rushby emphasized. He can be
reached via the Office of the President, National Security
Council as Chairman of the Interagency Technical Working
Group on Border Crossing.

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
¶11. (C) Japan Coast Guard officer Makoto Tamura provided an
update on the current status of the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and on Japan Coast Guard efforts to
support the MMEA. The MMEA was officially launched by the
Malaysian Prime Minister’s Office in February 2005 and began
operations on November 30, 2005. Japanese efforts to support
the MMEA include a JICA technical cooperation project on
“Maritime Guard and Rescue,” training seminars on maritime
security, a search and rescue workshop, maritime drug
enforcement seminar, and providing training opportunities at
the Japan Coast Guard Academy. Shimizu noted that the
Malaysian Customs Department has requested equipment in the
form of maritime security grant aid, and Japan is currently
studying the request.

¶12. (C) Fujimura asked participants if CT trilateral
countries should use the Philippine port project as a model
structure for the MMEA, or if an ad hoc approach is best
given Malaysian sensitivities to third-country assistance.
Australian Department of Transport and Regional Services
Director of International Relations David Hammond responded
that it is too early to use the Philippine port project as a
template for Malaysia. The environment in Malaysia is too
sensitive and it is dangerous to think we can create a silver
bullet or template to solve all maritime issues. We need to
be very careful with Malaysia, particularly since our
relationship with them is not as robust. Shimizu agreed and
stated that the case in the Philippines, compared to
Malaysia, is very different.

Improving Maritime Stability in Southeast Asia
——————————————— –

¶13. (C) Japan remains committed to the fight against
terrorism but the unstable domestic political situation and
weak Diet could constrain the government’s ability to
continue funding projects at current levels, Shimizu noted.
Due to a shrinking budget, Japan has had to curtail the
amount of financial assistance it provides, and cannot
finance U.S. programs in Southeast Asia. Information on U.S.
initiatives is still very useful in and of itself to Japan,
and Japan appreciates being informed on current and pending
U.S. efforts in the region.

¶14. (C) The U.S. delegation gave a presentation on inviting
trilateral partners to observe training events and
recommended that the U.S., Japan, and Australia hold a
trilateral meeting to coordinate training provided to
Southeast Asian countries. In addition, Fujimura recommended
the trilateral partner “operational components” work together
to build capacity in the region. Hammond agreed that
conceptionally, this is a good idea, but noted this would be
challenging since Australia uses a lot of contractors and
subcontractors. Japan would welcome additional cooperation
and coordination, Tamura noted. Fujimura, Hammond, and
Shimizu agreed that bulk cash courier training is one example
of where Australia, Japan, and the U.S. have worked well
together when providing training to other countries.

Philippines Port Project
¶15. (C) The U.S. and Australia provided an update on the
status of the “Needs Analysis Report,” led a discussion on
“lessons learned” and facilitated a brain storm session on
the possibility of applying the Philippines port project
model to include Davao International Airport. The
Philippines Port Project is a flagship for the trilateral
process, but is only one project within the trilateral

TOKYO 00000723 004.2 OF 004

process, Hammond emphasized. It does not represent the whole
process, he noted. It is often touted as a model, pilot, or
template, and our expectations may be too high, he stated.
The Philippines port project is only one specific issue, and
we can expect much more out of the trilateral process, he

¶16. (C) Australian delegates provided an overview of the
“Lessons Learned” document and noted the impact that Embassy
staff turnover can have on the timeline of accomplishing CT
trilateral goals. Staff turnover at Embassies delays the
amount of time it takes to make progress because new
personnel need to be educated on the CT process. Fujimura
agreed and noted that we need to improve communication so the
CT trilateral progress does not grind to a halt due to staff
turnover. Meeting on a regular basis is one way to
accomplish this, he suggested. It is also imperative for our
capitals to keep information flowing to Embassies at post, he

¶17. (C) Shimuzu stated he was impressed with the candid
honesty in the Lessons Learned paper and noted that if there
is a real need, Japan would support moving forward on the
Davao port project. Tokyo would need more information to be
able to successfully sell the project to Japanese
policymakers, however. From a local perspective, it might be
premature to move forward on Davao, but if Tokyo, Washington,
and Canberra supported a decision, we would do our best to
implement it, he stated.

Improving Border Controls in Indonesia
¶18. (C) Australia Department of Immigration and Citizenship
Security Policy Officer Katherine Taylor said Australia has
the energy to move forward on trilateral cooperation in Batam
Indonesia, but recommended that our embassies in Indonesia
meet to assess whether now is the right time to move forward.
We should examine the lessons learned from the port project
in the Philippines, she noted. Shimizu said Japan is not
convinced on the reasons behind picking Batam for our next
project when there are so many other priorities. The
Indonesian government is very sensitive and the CT trilateral
approach could easily backfire, he explained. Taylor said
Australia suggested Batam because there is a strong need, and
it would be easier to get started there, but noted Australia
welcomes other suggestions. Fujimura noted Batam is a common
transit route for terrorists and is a money laundering point.
Taylor emphasized that like Japan, Australia would not risk
jeopardizing its bilateral relationship with Indonesia, and
said in contrast to the Philippines, a very different
approach would be needed before Australia would be willing to
move forward.

Next Steps
¶19. (C) Australian, Japanese, and U.S. participants agreed
that it would not be necessary for the subgroup to meet again
before the next ambassador-level CT trilateral meeting. The
next CT trilateral will be held in the U.S. in mid-2008 but
the dates have not been set. The subgroups need to make
substantive progress before the ambassador-level meeting
takes place. In the interim, on-line discussions would be a
useful way to maintain momentum. Meeting on the side-lines
of other meetings might also be useful, the delegates agreed.
Finally, all sides noted the importance of continuing to
boost information sharing efforts.



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