Sep 152014
 

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06MANILA4396.html#

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANILA4396 2006-10-18 03:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manila
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHML #4396/01 2910343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180343Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3541
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 1517
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 2842
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6539
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0530
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/ISA/AP// IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS MANILA 004396

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR F, PM/HILLEN, S/CT, EAP, AND EAP/MTS
USPACOM ALSO FOR FPA HUSO
SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP (LAWLESS/TOOLAN/BAILEY)
SECDEF OSD/SOLIC FOR NADANER
JOINT STAFF/J5 (WILKES/ROBINSON/CLEMMONS)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER MARR MOPS MCAP PREL RP
SUBJECT: BOLSTERING THE CT FIGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1206/1207/1208 PROPOSALS

REF: A. MANILA 4150
¶B. MANILA 1396
¶C. MANILA 2427

¶1. (SBU) Summary. The Philippines is the easternmost front
line of the Global War on Terrorism. It faces multiple
threats, ranging from the al-Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiyah to
the local terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group and Rajah Solaiman
Movement. Quick-disbursing 1206, 1207, and 1208 funds that
provide a bridge to our longer-term Foreign Military
Financing and USAID assistance could help us fight terrorists
more effectively here. Our 1206 (train and equip) proposals
aim at improving maritime security in the Sulu and Celebes
Seas and at training local forces needed to ensure
post-conflict stability. Our 1207 (development) proposal
attacks the poverty and underdevelopment that provide fertile
ground for terrorism in the Sulu Archipelago. The
Australians have already committed to stand up one company of
the Philippine Army’s planned Riverine Battalion. Our 1208
(surrogate force) proposal would stand up a second company to
help control the brown water areas of central Mindanao. Our
targeted and cost-effective proposals in all total a little
under $39 million, while offering potentially significant
gains to both regional and U.S. national security. End
Summary.

¶2. (SBU) With over 7,000 islands and porous borders, the
Philippines faces multiple challenges in combating terrorism.
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
terrorists regularly transit Philippine waters with impunity,
exploiting the country’s poor surveillance and weak maritime
interdiction capabilities. The Rajah Solaiman Movement,
which we and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) are seeking to include on the UN Security
Council’s 1267 list, also remains active. Poverty and
government neglect have created fertile ground for the JI and
ASG, allowing them to create safe havens from which they can
recruit, train, plan, and conduct operations.
Quick-disbursing 1206 (train and equip), 1207 (development),
and 1208 (proxy force) funds will have an immediate, positive
impact on efforts to win control of the Sulu Archipelago and
the Sulu and Celebes Seas, and provide a bridge to
longer-term Foreign Military Financing and USAID assistance.

1206 – BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO DEFEAT THE TERRORISTS
——————————————— ——–

¶3. (U) Our FY07 1206 proposals, which we shared with U.S.
Pacific Command and other Southeast Asian Embassies during
the recent 1206 Regional Planning Conference in Manila (ref
a), would — in rank order:

– establish a Naval Special Operations Maritime Security
Force;
– supply HF radios to help operationalize the proposed “Coast
Watch South” initiative;
– establish a military bomb dog unit.
– train and equip National Guard-type units on Jolo island;
– train and equip civil military operations teams;
– upgrade Philippine Navy patrol aircraft; and,
– improve the capabilities of the Philippine Air Force’s
helicopter fleet.

MARITIME SECURITY FORCE (MSF)
—————————–

¶4. (SBU) Due to inadequate equipment and uneven training,
the Philippine Navy’s existing Special Operations units
cannot control the principal terrorist transit routes among
Sabah and Palawan, the Sulu Archipelago, and Sulawesi and
southern Mindanao. However, given the right equipment,
infrastructure, resources, a consolidated maintenance
program, and hand-picked officers and sailors, the Philippine
Navy could establish a credible coastal maritime interdiction
capability.

¶5. (SBU) Our proposed six-boat Maritime Security Force would
be based in Zamboanga and draw on existing personnel. It

would be built around a simple, dependable, relatively low
cost shallow draft craft, such as a 24-foot rigid inflatable
boat (RIB). Each boat would be equipped with simple,
reliable, off-the-shelf outboard engines, communications,
navigation, night vision, personal protective, and refueling
equipment, and have two 7.62 and one .50 caliber machine
guns. Boat facilities in the Sulu Archipelago would extend
the operational range of the unit, which would consist of
three two-boat detachments.

Estimated costs:
— boats $1.515 million
— boat equipment $0.273 million
— training $0.611 million
— boat facilities $0.431 million
— transportation $0.100 million
— FMS surcharge $0.095 million

Total estimated program cost: $3.025 million

HIGH FREQUENCY RADIOS FOR COAST WATCH SYSTEM
——————————————–

¶6. (SBU) The Philippines, with the help of the Australian
government, is developing the “Coast Watch South” initiative,
which is aimed at improving maritime security in the Sulu and
Celebes Seas, and consists of an integrated system of coast
watch stations, maritime intelligence fusion and command and
control centers, and interdiction units. U.S. assistance
could prove key to making this concept operational.

¶7. (SBU) The current Joint Interagency Task Force-West
(JIATF-West) funded Maritime Interagency Coordination Center
in Zamboanga and future centers in Palawan, General Santos
City, Cotobato, and Davao — with their all-source,
interagency approach to intelligence fusion — are natural
command, control, communications, and intelligence centers
that fit neatly into the Coast Watch South system. What they
need to make them operational are HF radios. The proposed HF
communications network would consist of the Manila
Headquarters, five base stations at the JIATF-West
Interagency Coordination Centers, and two smaller
sub-stations located on Balabac Island at the southern tip of
Palawan and Tawi Tawi island on the southern tip of the Sulu

Archipelago. Smaller hand-held radios would tie intercept
vessels into the system.

Estimated costs:
— system installation $1.223 million
— training $0.200 million
— initial spare parts package $0.200 million
— transportation $0.100 million
— FMS surcharge $0.061 million

Total estimated program cost: $1.784 million

BOMB DOG PROGRAM
—————-

¶8. (SBU) Improvised explosive devices are a constant threat
in the Philippines. Cheaply produced and easily hidden, they
represent an ever-present danger to U.S. personnel, as well
as to innocent Philippine civilians and Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) troops. Bomb dogs, because of their
accuracy, mobility, and ease of employment, provide a
significant countermeasure; however, the AFP lacks even a
basic canine explosive detection program.

¶9. (SBU) 1206 funds could radically improve security at
ports and ferry terminals by detecting either precursors or
explosive devices. Three separate bomb dog training
facilities and kennels in the high-threat areas of Zamboanga,
General Santos City, and Davao, each housing 36 fully trained
deployable working dogs, would represent a significant
deterrent to terrorists and improve protection for U.S.
forces. Costs would include the initial purchase of 108
fully trained dogs, the equipment to sustain them, facility

construction, and train-the-trainer training by U.S. dog
handlers.

Estimated costs:
— dog procurement $1.130 million
— kennel construction $0.450 million
— training $0.050 million
— transportation $0.116 million
— FMS surcharge $0.066 million

Total estimated program cost: $1.802 million

POST-CONFLICT STABILITY FORCE FOR JOLO
————————————–

¶10. (SBU) The Philippine National Police is almost totally
ineffective on Jolo and incapable of providing post-conflict
stability. Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs)
are a locally recruited militia, essentially the Philippine
version of the U.S. Army National Guard. After the
anticipated successful conclusion of its counterterrorism
operations on Jolo, the AFP plans to reduce the number of its
active duty battalions on the island and rely on the CAFGUs
as a stability force to hold and secure territory cleared by
regular troops. Philippine Army forces on Jolo include Moro
National Liberation Front integrees, who under the 1996 peace
agreement are only allowed to serve in their home province.
Successfully incorporating these integrees into well trained
CAFGUs would help ensure post-conflict stability, as well as
allow the AFP to offer a suitable place to proven soldiers
who have served honorably.

¶11. (SBU) The program would train and equip an AFP officered
battalion-sized CAFGU force to maintain a secure environment
and conduct limited counterterrorism and law enforcement
operations. Training would include instruction in police
procedures, rule of law, fixed point protection, convoy
security, anti-corruption, and respect for human rights.

Estimated costs:
— training $0.500 million
— equipment $4.000 million
— transportation $0.200 million
— FMS surcharge $0.179 million

Total estimated program cost: $4.879 million

BUILDING SALA’AM TEAM CAPACITY
——————————

¶12. (SBU) The AFP’s “Special Advocacy for
Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims” (Sala,am)
civil military teams provide the link between military units
and the local Muslim population during military operations in
Mindanao. They help establish and strengthen territorial
defense systems (e.g., Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Units and Coastal Watch Programs) and facilitate the
implementation and delivery of government projects and
services, including those of USAID. They are currently
limited in number, irregularly trained, and inadequately
equipped.

¶13. (SBU) Facilities, training, and equipment improvements
could make a real difference in ensuring Sala’am team
effectiveness. Our proposal would upgrade Sala’am training
facilities at Camp Malagutay near Zamboanga. A tailored
training program would focus on counterinsurgency doctrine,
the rule of law, human rights, and dispute
mitigation/resolution. Each Sala’am team would be equipped
with basic hand-held construction equipment to conduct civil
military operations, as well as equipment to produce
information operations material.

Estimated costs:
— training $0.500 million
— basic construction equipment $0.350 million
— transportation $0.050 million
— FMS surcharge $0.035 million

Total estimated program cost: $0.935 million

ISLANDER AIRCRAFT UPGRADE
————————-

¶14. (SBU) The Philippine Navy presently uses seven Islander
aircraft to conduct maritime patrols in the southern
Philippines. It plans to add an additional seven aircraft to
its inventory in the next two years. Patrol aircraft
personnel currently only use binoculars to detect possible
hostile vessels. Installing forward looking infrared
radar/intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissanc e (FLIR/ISR)
pods and upgraded communications equipment on the Islanders
would vastly improve the Navy’s ability to find, track, and
fix potential targets, allowing interdiction by the Maritime
Security Force or upgraded UH-1H helicopters.

Estimated costs:
— FLIR/ISR pods $5.600 million
— avionics and communications upgrades $0.045 million
— initial spare parts package $0.175 million
— training $0.140 million
— transportation $0.110 million
— FMS surcharge $0.231 million

Total estimated program cost: $6.301 million

UH-1H UPGRADES
————–

¶15. (SBU) The UH-1H is the workhorse of the Philippine Air
Force (PAF). It is the principal aircraft used to support
counterterrorism operations, and the only one with night
vision goggle-trained pilots. There are currently 41
operational UH-1Hs in the PAF inventory. Five other newly
refurbished aircraft have just arrived and are undergoing
test flights. Another 21 refurbished aircraft will arrive
during the next year, and the AFP intends to procure an
additional 27 aircraft during the next two years through its
Capability Upgrade Program.

¶16. (SBU) Upgraded armament (M240 machines guns), additional
night vision goggles, and insertion/extraction equipment
would vastly improve the ability of PAF UH-1H units to
support counterterrorism operations, including maritime
interdiction. Based in Zamboanga, upgraded UH-1Hs could
provide close-in surveillance of and interdiction in the Sulu
and Celebes Seas and the coastal region of central Mindanao,
the main areas of terrorist infiltration and operation.

Estimated costs:
— insertion/extraction equipment $0.283 million
— armament $3.052 million
— night vision goggles $0.802 million
— transportation $0.100 million
— training $0.750 million
— FMS surcharge $0.145 million

Total estimated program cost: $5.132 million

1207 – ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF STABILITY
——————————————— ——-

¶17. (U) Muslim Mindanao is the poorest region in the
Philippines. Our 1207 (development) proposal aims to address
the underlying causes of instability that provide fertile
ground for terrorism by:

– integrating security and development to improve local
livelihoods and foster stability;
– ameliorating the conditions — poverty, neglect, and weak
law enforcement — that extremists seek to exploit; and,
– targeting populations who are most vulnerable to extremist
influences, reinforcing structures that can counter and
discourage terrorists’ efforts, and lessen their ability to
gain recruits.

¶18. (U) Our focus is on the three main island groups of the
Sulu Archipelago — Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi. Based
largely on USAID,s highly successful Growth with Equity in
Mindanao (GEM) program, our 1207 program would be conducted
in close coordination with Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines’ civil-military operations planners and
substantially augment ongoing longer-term USAID development
projects. The focus would be on short-term interventions
designed to have maximum impact. Activities would consist
of: targeted small and medium infrastructure improvements
(farm-to-market roads, bridges, ports, wharves, community
centers, water and sanitation services); accelerated economic
and business development; micro-finance services; livelihood
training that would move farmers toward higher-value export
crops like fish or asparagus; education and health programs;
and, small scale solar and micro-hydro electrification
projects.

¶19. (U) We would hope to link this effort in following years
to similar programs targeting Palawan and the area around
General Santos City — the other sea lines of communication
terrorists use — and work with Embassies Kuala Lumpur and
Jakarta on an integrated approach that would develop
complementary programs in the respective adjoining areas of
Sabah, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.

Estimated costs:

— infrastructure improvements $4.3 million
— economic and business development $2.0 million
— livelihood programs $2.0 million
— education programs $2.0 million
— rural electrification programs $1.0 million
— health programs $0.7 million

Total estimated program costs: $12 million

1208 – RIVERINE SECURITY FORCE
——————————

¶20. (SBU) 1208 funds are designed for “surrogate” forces,
i.e., foreign forces that can support or facilitate
operations by United States Special Operations Forces.
Control of the littoral area of central Mindanao and the
Liguasan Marsh has been a perennial problem for the AFP.
Given the right equipment, infrastructure, resources, and
maintenance program, sufficient personnel exist to establish
quickly a brown water interdiction capability. General
Generoso Esperon, the AFP Chief of Staff, intends to
establish a Philippine Army Riverine Battalion composed of
three companies. Australia has undertaken to train and equip
one of these companies. Standing up a second company would
allow the AFP to deny the Liguasan Marsh to the terrorists,
control transit areas, and create a capable counterterrorism
partner for U.S. forces.

¶21. (SBU) Our proposal would train and equip a six boat
company-sized Riverine Security Force (RSF) using a simple,
dependable, relatively low cost shallow draft craft, such as
a rigid inflatable boats (RIB). Each boat would require
simple, off-the-shelf outboard engines, communications,
navigation, night vision, personal protective and refueling
equipment, weapons, and spare parts.

Estimated costs:
— boats $1.515 million
— boat equipment $0.273 million
— training $0.611 million
— boat facilities $0.431 million
— transportation $0.100 million
— FMS surcharge $0.095 million

Total estimated program costs: $3.025 million

TARGETED, AND COST-EFFECTIVE
—————————-

¶21. (SBU) Our proposals are targeted and cost-effective.
They represent an integrated concept of how to combat the
terrorist threat in the southern Philippines. At a rough
total cost of just under $39 million, this is a reasonable
investment that offers potentially significant gains to both
regional and U.S. national security.

Visit Embassy Manila’s Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm
KENNEY

   

 

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