Oct 042014
 

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06TOKYO1612.html#
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO1612
2006-03-28 07:48
2011-08-30 01:44
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo

VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1612/01 0870748
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280748Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0202
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1587
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 4086
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 1639
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0662
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 6571
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001612

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL SNAR EAID IN MY RP JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR YAMAMOTO DISCUSSES COUNTERTERRORISM

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (C) Summary. During a March 27 meeting with the DCM,
MOFA Ambassador for Counterterrorism (CT) Cooperation,
Reconstruction Activities in Iraq and North Korea Nuclear
Issues Tadamichi Yamamoto:

— stressed the need to identify implementable steps for the
next U.S.-Japan-Australia CT Trilateral,

— briefed the DCM on Japan’s CT priorities, and

— expressed hope that a high-level U.S. visit could
reenergize Japanese ministries to focus on CT. End Summary.

CT Trilateral
————-

¶2. (C) Tadamichi Yamamoto, Ambassador for Counterterrorism
Cooperation, Reconstruction Activities in Iraq and North
Korea Nuclear Issues, told DCM Donovan on March 27 that he
understood it might take some time to schedule the next
U.S.-Japan-Australia Counterterrorism (CT) Trilateral,
originally planned for March. The Government of Japan is
adjusting to the new timeline and will plan a different
approach to the Trilateral if it is held in June or July.
Japan has scheduled a bilateral CT dialogue with ASEAN in
early June and, if the Trilateral is held after that
bilateral, Japan would be able to present a concrete plan of
action to the United States and Australia. Yamamoto hoped to
use the Trilateral to coordinate future action with the
United States and Australia.

¶3. (C) It is important to identify implementable steps for
CT cooperation, Yamamoto stressed. This year, Japan’s CT
programs will be limited to Southeast Asia, but he said Japan
hopes to expand them to South Asia and Bangladesh, in
particular, next year. Bangladesh borders Burma and suffers
from poor governance, leaving it vulnerable to exploitation
by terrorists, Yamamoto observed. Looking at Central Asia
would be the next step, although including it in Japan’s CT
planning may be several years in coming. When asked about
the possibility of joint training, Yamamoto agreed that it
would be a good thing to do, but remarked he is unconvinced
that it is welcome in countries like the Philippines. In his
experience, the Philippines is reluctant to train with
others, so it is important to discuss any proposal for this
kind of activity with them carefully. A low-key approach is
probably best, Yamamoto suggested.

Need to Motivate GOJ to Focus on CT
———————————–

¶4. (C) A visit to Japan by Ambassador Crumpton would greatly
benefit the CT cause in Japan, Yamamoto emphasized.
Ambassador Crumpton’s presence would be substantively
helpful, and would also impress upon Japan’s ministries and
agencies that CT is an important area that needs constant
attention. Yamamoto would like to help arrange high-level
meetings for Ambassador Crumpton at the ministries, the
National Policy Agency and Prime Minister’s Office. In order
for Japan to effectively implement CT projects, it needs
buy-in from many ministries and agencies, even ones with a
domestic focus. Yamamoto lobbied hard to hold the next
Trilateral in Tokyo because he wanted to lock in commitments
across the Japanese government. When asked for his thoughts
on the bilateral Counterterrorism Working Group, Yamamoto
thought it would be useful to hold the Trilateral first, in
order to focus the participating ministries on the issue.

¶5. (C) Yamamoto assured us that Japan understands the need
to be part of the global CT effort, but remains a bit more
complacent about terrorist threats than the United States or
Australia. Because Japan is not targeted by Islamic
fundamentalists, Yamamoto has found it difficult to get the
Japanese ministries and agencies — particularly ones with a
domestic focus — to pay attention to hot spots outside of
Southeast Asia.

¶6. (C) Japan’s near-term goal is to build CT capacity in
Southeast Asia, Yamamoto explained. MOFA hopes to use its
new grant aid system to do it. In the coming year, MOFA will
have $70 million of grant aid for counterterrorism projects.
It needs to spend the full $70 million this year and will
draw up a menu of project options internally before
approaching Southeast Asian governments. Yamamoto predicted
that Japan would concentrate its efforts on Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. When asked if Japan
would be constrained in providing equipment such as patrol
boats, Yamamoto did not think it would be a problem.
Already, Japan is sending two patrol boats to Indonesia. He
clarified that Japan’s principle of not exporting defense
technologies or equipment is not a constitutional or legal
restraint, but a policy one. When the Cabinet in 2005
decided to exempt equipment and technological exports to the
United States for missile defense purposes, an exemption for
the prevention of counterterrorism was included, too.
SCHIEFFER

   

 

Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.